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1 Introduction.
Economic analyses of climate change policies often focus on a set of “likely” scenarios —
those within a roughly 66 to 90 percent confidence interval — for emissions, increases in
temperature, economic impacts, and abatement costs. It is hard to justify the immediate
adoption of a stringent abatement policy given these scenarios and consensus estimates of
discount rates and other relevant parameters.1 I ask whether a stringent policy might be
justified by a cost-benefit analysis that accounts for a full distribution of possible outcomes.
Recent climate science and economic impact studies provide information about less likely
scenarios, and allow one to at least roughly estimate the distributions for temperature change
and its economic impact. I show how these distributions can be incorporated in and affect
conclusions from analyses of climate change policy. As a framework for policy analysis,
I estimate a simple measure of “willingness to pay” (WTP): the fraction of consumption
w∗(τ ) that society would be willing to sacrifice, now and throughout the future, to ensure
that any increase in temperature at a specific horizon H, ∆TH, is limited to τ . Whether the
reduction in consumption corresponding to a particular w∗(τ ) is sufficient to limit warming
to τ is a separate question which I do not address. Thus I avoid having to make projections
of GHG emissions and atmospheric concentrations, or estimate abatement costs. Instead I
focus directly on uncertainties over temperature change and its economic impact.2
My analysis is based on the current “state of knowledge” regarding global warming and
its impact. In particular, I use information on the distributions for temperature change from
scientific studies assembled by the IPCC (2007) and information about economic impacts
from recent “integrated assessment models” (IAMs) to fit displaced gamma distributions
for these variables. But unlike existing IAMs, I model economic impact as a relationship
between temperature change and the growth rate of GDP as opposed to the level of GDP.
1An exception is the Stern Review (2007), but as Nordhaus (2007), Weitzman (2007), Mendelsohn (2008)
and others point out, that study makes assumptions about temperature change, economic impact, abatement
costs, and discount rates that are well outside the consensus range.
2By “economic impact” I mean to include any adverse impacts resulting from global warming, such as
social, medical, or direct economic impacts.
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This distinction is justified on theoretical and empirical grounds, and implies that warming
can have a permanent impact on future GDP. I then examine whether “reasonable” values
for the remaining parameters (e.g., the starting growth rate and the index of risk aversion)
can yield values of w∗(τ ) above 2 or 3% for small values of τ , which might support stringent
abatement. Also, by transforming the displaced gamma distributions, I show how w∗(τ )
depends on the mean, variance, and skewness of each distribution, which provides additional
insight into how uncertainty drives WTP.
To explore the case for stringent abatement, I use a counterfactual — and pessimistic
— scenario for temperature change: Under “business as usual” (BAU), the atmospheric
GHG concentration immediately increases to twice its pre-industrial level, which leads to
an (uncertain) increase in temperature at the horizon H, and then (from feedback effects or
further emissions) a gradual further doubling of that temperature increase.
This paper builds on recent work byWeitzman (2009), but takes a very different approach.
Weitzman addresses our lack of knowledge about the right-hand tail of the distribution for
temperature change, ∆T . Suppose there is some underlying probability distribution for ∆T ,
but its variance is unknown and is estimated through ongoing Bayesian learning. Weitzman
shows that this “structural uncertainty” implies that the posterior-predictive distribution of
∆T is “fat-tailed,” i.e., approaches zero at a less than exponential rate (and thus has no
moment generating function). If welfare is given by a power utility function, this means
that the expected loss of future welfare from warming is infinite, so that society should
be willing to sacrifice all current consumption to avoid future warming. In another paper,
Weitzman (2009b) presents an alternative argument, based on the underlying mechanism of
GHG accumulation and its effect on temperature, for why the distribution of ∆T should be
fat-tailed, but this has the same disturbing welfare implications.3
Weitzman provides insight into the nature of the uncertainty underlying climate change
policy, but his results do not readily translate into a policy prescription, e.g., what percentage
of consumption society should sacrifice to avoid warming. What his results do tell us is that
3For a related discussion of inherent uncertainty over climate sensitivity, and a model that implies a
fat-tailed distribution for ∆T , see Roe and Baker (2007).
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the right-hand tail of the distribution for ∆T may matter most for policy, and we know very
little about that tail. In other words, because of its focus on the middle of the distribution
of outcomes, traditional cost-benefit analysis may be misleading.
I utilize a (thin-tailed) three-parameter displaced gamma distribution for temperature
change, which I calibrate using estimates of its mean and confidence intervals inferred from
the studies surveyed by the IPCC. Besides its simplicity and reasonable fit to the IPCC
studies, this approach has two advantages. First, a thin-tailed distribution avoids infinite
welfare losses (or the need to arbitrarily bound the utility function to avoid infinite losses).
Second, the skewness or variance of the distribution can be altered while holding the other
moments fixed, providing additional insight into tail effects.
I specify an economic impact function that relates temperature change to the growth
rate of GDP and consumption, and calibrate the relationship using damage functions from
several IAMs. Although these damage functions are based on levels of GDP, I can calibrate
a growth rate function by matching estimates of GDP/temperature change pairs at a specific
horizon. I then use the distribution of GDP level reductions at that horizon to fit a displaced
gamma distribution for the growth rate impact.
After fitting gamma distributions to temperature change and growth rate impact, I cal-
culate WTP based on expected discounted utility, using a constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) utility function. In addition to the initial growth rate and index of risk aversion,
WTP is affected by the rate of time preference (the rate at which future utility is discounted).
I set this rate to zero, the “reasonable” (if controversial) value that gives the highest WTP.4
My estimates of w∗(τ ) are generally below 2%, even for τ around 2 or 3◦C. This is because
there is limited weight in the tails of the calibrated distributions for ∆T and growth rate
4Newbold and Daigneault (2008) also studied implications of uncertainty for climate change policy. They
combined a distribution for ∆T with CRRA utility and functions that translate ∆T into lost consumption
to estimate WTP. They assume there is a “true” value for ∆T and focus on how distributions from different
studies could be combined to obtain a (Bayesian) posterior distribution. They solve for the parameters of a
distribution derived by Roe and Baker (2007) for each of 21 studies that estimated 5th and 95th percentiles,
and combined the resulting distributions in two ways: (1) averaging them, which (“pessimistically”) assumes
the studies used the same data but different models, and yields a relatively diffuse posterior distribution; and
(2) multiplying them, which (“optimistically”) assumes the studies used the same model but independent
datasets, and yields a relatively tight posterior distribution.
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impact. Larger estimates of WTP result for particular combinations of parameter values
(e.g., an index of risk aversion close to 1 and a low initial GDP growth rate), or if I assume
an accelerated rate of warming (i.e., the distribution for ∆T applies to a shorter horizon).
But overall, given the current “state of knowledge” of warming and its impact, my results
are consistent with moderate abatement. Of course the “state of knowledge” is evolving and
new studies might lead to changes in the distributions. The framework developed here could
then be used to evaluate the policy implications of such changes.
This paper ignores the implications of the opposing irreversibilities inherent in climate
change policy and the value of waiting for more information. Immediate action reduces the
largely irreversible build-up of GHGs in the atmosphere, but waiting avoids an irreversible
investment in abatement capital that might turn out to be at least partly unnecessary,
and the net effect of these irreversibilities is unclear. I focus instead on the nature of the
uncertainty and its application to a relatively simple cost-benefit analysis.5
The next section explains in more detail the methodology used in this paper and its
relationship to other studies of climate change policy. Section 3 discusses the probabil-
ity distribution for temperature change and how it can be transformed to estimate mean,
variance and skewness effects. Section 4 discusses the economic impact function and the cor-
responding uncertainty. Section 5 shows estimates of willingness to pay and its dependence
on free parameters, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and Methodology.
Most economic analyses of climate change policy have five elements: (1) Projections of future
emissions of a CO2 equivalent (CO2e) composite (or individual GHGs) under a “business
as usual” (BAU) and one or more abatement scenarios, and resulting future atmospheric
5A number of studies have examined the policy implications of this interaction of uncertainty and ir-
reversibility, but with mixed results, showing that policy adoption might be delayed or accelerated. See,
for example, Kolstad (19996b), Gollier, Jullien and Treich (2000), and Fisher and Narain (2003), who use
two-period models for tractability; and include Kolstad (1996a), Pindyck (2000, 2002) and Newell and Pizer
(2003), who use multi-period or continuous-time models. For a discussion of these and other studies of the
interaction of uncertainty and irreversibility, see Pindyck (2007).
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CO2e concentrations. (2) Projections of the average or regional temperature changes likely
to result from higher CO2e concentrations. (3) Projections of lost GDP and consumption
resulting from higher temperatures. (This is probably the most speculative element because
of uncertainty over adaptation to climate change, e.g., through shifts in agriculture, migra-
tion, etc.) (4) Estimates of the cost of abating GHG emissions by various amounts. (5)
Assumptions about social utility and the rate of time preference, so that lost consumption
from abatement can be weighed against future gains in consumption from reduced warming.
This is essentially the approach of Nordhaus (1994, 2008), Stern (2007), and others who eval-
uate abatement policies using integrated assessment models (IAMs) that project emissions,
CO2e concentrations, temperature change, economic impact, and costs of abatement.
Each of these five elements of an IAM-based analysis is subject to considerable uncer-
tainty. However, by estimating WTP instead of evaluating specific policies, I avoid having to
deal with abatement costs and projections of GHG emissions. Instead, I focus on uncertainty
over temperature change and its economic impact as follows.
2.1 Temperature Change.
According to the most recent IPCC report (2007), growing GHG emissions would likely lead
to a doubling of the atmospheric CO2e concentration relative to the pre-industrial level by
the end of this century. That, in turn, would cause an increase in global mean temperature
that would “most likely” range between 1.0◦C to 4.5◦C, with an expected value of 2.5◦C to
3.0◦C. The IPCC report indicates that this range, derived from a “summary” of the results
of 22 scientific studies the IPCC surveyed, represents a roughly 66- to 90-percent confidence
interval, i.e., there is a 5 to 17-percent probability of a temperature increase above 4.5◦C.6
The 22 studies themselves also provide rough estimates of increases in temperature at
the outer tail of the distribution. In summarizing them, the IPCC translated the implied
outcome distributions into a standardized form that allows comparability across the studies,
6The atmospheric CO2e concentration was about 300 ppm in 1900, and is now about 370 ppm. The IPCC
(2007) projects an increase to 550 to 600 ppm by 2100. The text of the IPCC report is vague as to whether
the 1.0◦C to 4.5◦C “most likely” range for ∆T in 2100 represents a 66% or a 90% confidence interval.
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and created graphs showing multiple outcome distributions implied by groups of studies.
As Weitzman (2008) has argued, those distributions suggest that there is a 5% probability
that a doubling of the CO2e concentration relative to the pre-industrial level would lead
to a global mean temperature increase of 7◦C or more, and a 1% probability that it would
lead to a temperature increase of 10◦C or more. I fit a three-parameter displaced gamma
distribution for ∆T to these 5% and 1% points and to a mean temperature change of 3.0◦C.
This distribution conforms with the distributions summarized by the IPCC, and can be used
to study “tail effects” by calculating the impact on WTP of changes in the distribution’s
variance or skewness (holding the other moments fixed).
I assume that the fitted gamma distribution for ∆T applies to a 100-year horizon H and
that ∆Tt → 2∆TH as t gets large. This implies that ∆Tt follows the trajectory:
7
∆Tt = 2∆TH[1− (1/2)
t/H ] , (1)
Thus if ∆TH = 5
◦C, ∆Tt reaches 2.93
◦C after 50 years, 5◦C after 100 years, 7.5◦C after 200
years, and then gradually approaches 10◦C.
2.2 Economic Impact.
Most economic studies of climate change relate ∆T to GDP through a “loss function” L(∆T ),
with L(0) = 1 and L′ < 0, so that GDP at some horizon H is L(∆TH)GDPH , where GDPH
is but-for GDP in the absence of warming. These studies typically use an inverse-quadratic
or exponential-quadratic function.8 This implies that if temperatures rise but later fall, GDP
could return to its but-for path with no permanent loss.
There are reasons to expect warming to affect the growth rate of GDP as opposed to
7This allows for possible feedback effects and/or further emissions. As summarized in Weitzman (2009b),
the simplest dynamic model relating ∆Tt to the GHG concentration Gt is the differential equation
d∆T/dt = m1[ln(Gt/G0)/ ln 2 − m2∆Tt] .
Assuming Gt initially doubles to 2G0, ∆Tt = ∆TH at t = H , and ∆Tt → 2∆TH as t→∞, implies eqn. (1).
8The inverse-quadratic loss function used in the current version of the Nordhaus (2008) DICE model
is L = 1/[1 + pi1∆T + pi2(∆T )
2]. Weitzman (2008) introduced the exponential loss function L(∆T ) =
exp[−β(∆T )2], which, as he points out, allows for greater losses when ∆T is large.
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the level. First, some effects of warming are likely to be permanent: for example, destruc-
tion of ecosystems from erosion and flooding, extinction of species, and deaths from health
effects and weather extremes. Second, resources needed to counter the impact of higher tem-
peratures would reduce those available for R&D and capital investment, reducing growth.
Adaptation to rising temperatures is equivalent to the cost of increasingly strict emission
standards, which, as Stokey (1998) has shown with an endogenous growth model, reduces
the rate of return on capital and lowers the growth rate.9
Finally, there is empirical support for a growth rate effect. Using historical data on
temperatures and precipitation over the past 50 years for a panel of 136 countries, Dell,
Jones, and Olken (2008) have shown that higher temperatures reduce GDP growth rates
but not levels. The impact they estimate is large — a decrease of 1.1 percentage points of
growth for each 1◦C rise in temperature — but significant only for poorer countries.10
I assume that in the absence of warming, real GDP and consumption would grow at a
constant rate g0, but warming will reduce this rate:
gt = g0 − γ∆Tt (2)
This simple linear relation was estimated by Dell, Jones, and Olken (2008), and can be
viewed as at least a first approximation to a more complex loss function.
If temperatures increase but are later reduced through stringent abatement (or geo-
engineering), eqn. (2) will have very different implications for future GDP than a level loss
function L(∆T ). Suppose, for example, that temperature increases by 0.1◦C per year for 50
years and then decreases by 0.1◦C per year for the next 50 years. Figure 1 compares two
9Suppose total capital K = Kp +Ka(T ), with K
′
a(T ) > 0, where Kp is directly productive capital and
Ka(T ) is capital needed for adaptation to the temperature T (e.g., stronger retaining walls and pumps to
counter flooding, new infrastructure and housing to support migration, more air conditioning and insulation,
etc.). If all capital depreciates at rate δK , K˙p = K˙ − K˙a = I − δKK −K
′
a(T )T˙ , so that the rate of growth
of Kp is reduced. See Brock and Taylor (2004) for a related analysis.
10“Poor” means below-median PPP-adjusted per-capita GDP. Using World Bank data for 209 countries,
“poor” by this definition accounts for 26.9% of 2006 world GDP, which implies a roughly 0.3 percentage
point reduction in world GDP growth for each 1◦C rise in temperature. In a follow-on paper (2009), they
estimate a model that allows for adaptation effects, so that the long-run impact of warming is smaller than
the short-run impact. They find a long-run decrease of 0.51 percentage points of growth for each 1◦C rise in
temperature, but again only for poorer countries.
7
consumption trajectories: CAt , which corresponds to the exponential-quadratic loss function
L(∆T ) = exp[−β(∆T )2], and CBt , which corresponds to eqn. (2). The example assumes that
without warming, consumption would grow at 0.5 percent per year — trajectory C0t — and
both loss functions are calibrated so that at the maximum ∆T of 5◦C, CA = CB = .95C0.
Note that as ∆T falls to zero, CAt reverts to C
0
t , but C
B
t remains permanently below C
0
t .
Uncertainty is introduced into eqn. (2) through the parameter γ. Using information from
a number of IAMs, I obtain a distribution for β in the exponential loss function:
L(∆T ) = e−β(∆T )
2
, (3)
which applies to the level of GDP. I translate this into a distribution for γ using the trajectory
for GDP and consumption implied by eqn. (2) for a temperature change-impact combination
projected to occur at horizon H. From eqns. (1) and (2), the growth rate is gt = g0 −
2γ∆TH[1− (1/2)
t/H ]. Normalizing initial consumption at 1, this implies:
Ct = e
∫ t
0
g(s)ds = exp
{
−
2γH∆TH
ln(1/2)
+ (g0 − 2γ∆TH)t+
2γH∆TH
ln(1/2)
(1/2)t/H
}
. (4)
Thus γ is obtained from β by equating the expressions for CH implied by eqns. (3) and (4):
exp
{
−
2γH∆TH
ln(1/2)
+ (g0 − 2γ∆TH)H +
γH∆TH
ln(1/2)
}
= exp{g0H − β(∆TH)
2} , (5)
so that γ = 1.79β∆TH/H.
The IPCC does not provide standardized distributions for lost GDP corresponding to
any particular ∆T , but it does survey the results of several IAMS. As discussed in Section 4,
I use the information from the IPCC along with other studies to infer means and confidence
intervals for β and thus γ. As with ∆T , I fit a displaced gamma distribution to the parameter
γ, which I use to study implications of impact uncertainty on WTP.
2.3 Willingness to Pay.
Given the distributions for ∆T and γ, I posit a CRRA social utility function:
U(Ct) = C
1−η
t /(1− η) , (6)
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where η is the index of relative risk aversion (and 1/η is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution). I calculate the fraction of consumption — now and throughout the future —
society would sacrifice to ensure that any increase in temperature at a specific horizon H is
limited to an amount τ . That fraction, w∗(τ ), is the measure of willingness to pay.11
An issue in debates over climate change policy is the social discount rate (SDR) on
consumption. The Stern Review (2007) used a rate just over 1 percent; critiques by Nordhaus
(2007), Weitzman (2007) and others argue for a rate closer to the private return on investment
(PRI), around 5 to 6 percent. As Stern (2008) makes clear, the SDR could differ from the
PRI, in part because a social investment can affect the consumption trajectory. In my model
the consumption discount rate is endogenous; in the Ramsey growth context,
Rt = δ + ηgt = δ + ηg0 − 2ηγ∆TH[1− (1/2)
t/H ] , (7)
where δ is the rate of time preference, i.e., the rate at which utility is discounted. Thus Rt
falls over time as ∆T increases.12 The “correct” value of δ is itself a subject of debate; I will
generally set δ = 0 because one of my objectives is to determine whether any combination
of “reasonable” parameter values can yield a high WTP.
If ∆TH and γ were known, social welfare would be given by:
W =
∫
∞
0
U(Ct)e
−δtdt =
1
1− η
∫
∞
0
eρ0−ρ1t−ω(1/2)
t/H
dt , (8)
where
ρ0 = −2(1− η)γH∆TH)/ ln(1/2) , (9)
ρ1 = (η − 1)(g0 − 2γ∆TH + δ , (10)
ω = 2(η − 1)γH∆TH/ ln(1/2) . (11)
11The use of WTP as a welfare measure goes back at least to Debreu (1954), was used by Lucas (1987) to
estimate the welfare cost of business cycles, and was used in the context of climate change (with τ = 0) by
Heal and Kristro¨m (2002) and Weitzman (2008).
12If 2ηγ∆TH > δ + ηg0, Rt becomes negative as ∆T grows. This is entirely consistent with the Ramsey
growth model, as pointed out by Dasgupta et al (1999). They provide a simple example in which climate
change results in a 2% annual decline in global consumption, and thus a negative consumption discount rate.
Of course other models also imply a declining discount rate; see, e.g., Cropper and Laibson (1999).
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Suppose society sacrifices a fraction w(τ ) of present and future consumption to ensure
that ∆TH ≤ τ . Then social welfare at t = 0 would be:
W1(τ ) =
[1− w(τ )]1−η
1− η
E0,τ
∫
∞
0
eρ˜0−ρ˜1t−ω˜(1/2)
t/H
dt , (12)
where E0,τ denotes the expectation at t = 0 over the distributions of ∆TH and γ conditional
on ∆TH ≤ τ . (I use tildes to denote that ρ0, ρ1, and ω are functions of two random variables.)
If, on the other hand, no action is taken to limit warming, social welfare would be:
W2 =
1
1− η
E0
∫
∞
0
eρ˜0−ρ˜1t−ω˜(1/2)
t/H
dt , (13)
where E0 again denotes the expectation over ∆TH and γ, but now with ∆TH unconstrained.
Willingness to pay to ensure that ∆TH ≤ τ is the value w
∗(τ ) that equatesW1(τ ) and W2.
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2.4 Policy Implications.
The case for any abatement policy will depend as much on the cost of that policy as it does
on the benefits. I do not estimate abatement costs — I only estimate WTP as a function
of τ , the abatement-induced limit on any increase in temperature at the horizon H. Clearly
the amount and cost of abatement needed will decrease as τ is made larger, so I consider a
stringent abatement policy to be one for which τ is “low,” which I take to be at or below
the expected value of ∆T under a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, i.e., about 3◦C.
I examine whether the fitted displaced gamma distributions for ∆T and γ, along with
“reasonable” values of the remaining economic parameters can yield values of w∗(τ ) greater
than 2 or 3% for τ ≈ 3◦C. I also explore “tail effects” by transforming the distributions to
increase skewness or variance while keeping the other moments fixed, and calculating the
resulting change in w∗(τ ). Finally, to explore the case for a stringent abatement policy, I
focus on conservative parameter assumptions, in the sense of leading to a higher WTP.
13As a practical matter, I calculate WTP using a finite horizon of 500 years. After some 200 years the
world will likely exhaust the economically recoverable stocks of fossil fuels, so that GHG concentrations will
fall. In addition, so many other economic and social changes are likely that the relevance of applying CRRA
expected utility over more than a few hundred years is questionable.
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3 Temperature Change.
The IPCC (2007a) surveyed 22 scientific studies of climate sensitivity, the increase in tem-
perature that would result from an anthropomorphic doubling of the atmospheric CO2e
concentration. Given that a doubling (relative to the pre-industrial level) by the end of the
century is the IPCC’s consensus prediction, I treat climate sensitivity as a rough proxy for
∆T a century from now. Each of the studies surveyed provided both a point estimate and
information about the uncertainty around that estimate, such as confidence intervals and/or
probability distributions. The IPCC translated these results into a standardized form so
that they could be compared, created graphs with multiple distributions implied by groups
of studies, and estimated that the studies implied an expected value of 2.5◦C to 3.0◦C for
climate sensitivity. How one aggregates the results of these studies depends on beliefs about
the underlying models and data. Although this likely overestimates the size of the tails,
I will assume that the studies used the same data but different models, and average the
results. This is more or less what Weitzman (2009) did, and my estimates of the tails from
the aggregation of these studies are close to (but slightly lower) than his. To be conservative,
I use his estimate of a 17% probability that a doubling of the CO2e concentration would
lead to a mean temperature increase of 4.5◦C or more, a 5% probability of a temperature
increase of 7.0◦C or more, and a 1% probability of a temperature increase of 10.0◦C or more.
Thus the 5% and 1% tails of the distribution for ∆T clearly represent extreme outcomes;
temperature increases of this magnitude are outside the range of human experience.
I fit a displaced gamma distribution to these summary numbers. Letting θ be the dis-
placement parameter, the distribution is given by:
f(x; r, λ, θ) =
λr
Γ(r)
(x− θ)r−1e−λ(x−θ) , x ≥ θ , (14)
where Γ(r) is the Gamma function:
Γ(r) =
∫
∞
0
sr−1e−sds
The moment generating function for this distribution is:
Mx(t) = E(e
tx) =
(
λ
λ− t
)r
etθ (15)
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Thus the mean, variance and skewness (around the mean) are given by E(x) = r/λ + θ,
V(x) = r/λ2, and S(x) = 2r/λ3 respectively.
Fitting f(x; r, λ, θ) to a mean of 3◦C, and the 5% and 1% points at 7◦C and 10◦C re-
spectively yields r = 3.8, λ = 0.92, and θ = −1.13. The distribution is shown in Figure 2.
It has a variance and skewness around the mean of 4.49 and 9.76 respectively. Note that
this distribution implies that there is a small (2.9 percent) probability that a doubling of the
CO2e concentration will lead to a reduction in mean temperature, and indeed this possibility
is consistent with several of the scientific studies. The distribution also implies that the
probability of a temperature increase of 4.5◦C or greater is 21%.
Later I will want to change the mean, variance or skewness while keeping the other
two moments fixed. Denote the scaling factors for these moments by αM , αV , and αS,
respectively. (Setting αS = 1.5 increases the skewness by 50%.) Using the equations for the
moments, to change the skewness by a factor of αS while keeping the mean and variance
fixed, replace the original values of r, λ, and θ with r1 = r/α
2
S , λ1 = λ/αS , and θ1 =
θ + (1− 1/αS)r/λ. Likewise, to change the variance by a factor αV while keeping the mean
and skewness fixed, set r1 = α
3
V r, λ1 = αV λ, and θ1 = θ + (1− α
2
V )r/λ. Finally, to change
the mean by a factor αM while keeping the other moments fixed, keep r and λ the same but
set θ1 = αMθ + (αM − 1)r/λ, which simply shifts the distribution to the right or left.
Figure 3 shows the effects of increasing the skewness or variance by 50% while keeping the
other moments fixed. With an increase in skewness, there is some shift of variation towards
the right-hand tail, but the effects are negligible: the probabilities of a ∆T of 7◦C (10◦C)
or greater remain 5% (1%). Increasing the variance by 50% while holding the skewness
and mean fixed thickens both tails; the probability of ∆T ≥ 5◦C increases to 7%, and the
probability of ∆T ≥ 10◦C remains 1%.
Recall that the distribution for ∆T pertains to a point in time, H, and I assume that
temperature follows the trajectory of eqn. (1), so that ∆Tt → 2∆TH as t gets large. This is
illustrated in Figure 4, which shows a trajectory for ∆T when it is unconstrained (and ∆TH
happens to equal 5◦C), and when it is constrained so that ∆TH ≤ τ = 3
◦C. Note that even
when constrained, ∆TH is a random variable and (unless τ = 0) will be less than τ with
12
probability 1; in Figure 4 it happens to be 2.5◦C. If τ = 0, then ∆T = 0 for all t.
4 Economic Impact.
What would be the economic impact (broadly construed) of a temperature increase of 7◦C or
greater? One might answer, as Stern (2007, 2008) does, that we simply do not (and cannot)
know, because we have had no experience with this extent of warming, and there are no
models that can say much about the impact on production, migration, disease prevalence,
and a host of other relevant factors. Of course we could say the same thing about the
probabilities of temperature increases of 7◦C or more, which are also outside the range of
the climate science models behind the studies surveyed by the IPCC. This is essentially the
argument made by Weitzman (2009a), but in terms of underlying “structural uncertainty”
that can never be resolved even as more data arrive over the coming decades. But if large
temperature increases are what really matter, this gives us no handle on policy.
Instead, I take IAMs and related models of economic impact at face value and treat them
analogously to the climate science models. These models yield a rough consensus regarding
possible economic impacts: for temperature increases up to 4◦C, the “most likely” impact
is from 1% to at most 5% of GDP.14 Of interest is the outer tail of the distribution for this
impact. There is some chance that a temperature increase of 3◦C or 4◦C would have a much
larger impact, and we want to know how that affects WTP.
At issue is the value of γ in eqn. (2). Different IAMs and other economic studies sug-
gest different values for this parameter, and although there are no estimates of confidence
intervals (that I am aware of), intervals can be inferred from some of the variation in the
suggested values. I therefore treat this parameter as stochastic and distributed as gamma,
as in eqn. (14). I further assume that γ and ∆T are independently distributed, which is
realistic given that they are governed by completely different physical/economic processes.
Based on its own survey of impact estimates from four IAMs, the IPCC (2007b) concludes
14This consensus might arise from the use of similar ad hoc damage functions in various IAMs.
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that “global mean losses could be 1–5% of GDP for 4◦C of warming.”15 In addition, Dietz
and Stern (2008) provide a graphical summary of damage estimates from several IAMs,
which yield a range of 0.5% to 2% of lost GDP for ∆T = 3◦C, and 1% to 8% of lost GDP
for ∆T = 5◦C. I treat these ranges as “most likely” outcomes, and use the IPCC’s definition
of “most likely” to mean a 66 to 90-percent confidence interval. Using the IPCC range and,
to be conservative, assuming it applies to a 66-percent confidence interval, I take the mean
loss for ∆T = 4◦C to be 3% of GDP, and the 17-percent and 83-percent confidence points
to be 1% of GDP and 5% of GDP respectively. These three numbers apply to the value of
β in eqn. (3), but they are easily translated into corresponding numbers for γ in eqn. (2).
From eqn. (5), γ = 1.79β∆T/H. Thus the mean, 17-percent, and 83-percent values for γ
are, respectively, γ¯ = .0001363, γ1 = .0000450, and γ2 = .0002295.
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Using these three numbers to fit a 3-parameter displaced gamma distribution for γ yields
rg = 4.5, λg = 21,341, and θg = γ¯ − rg/λg = −.0000746. This distribution is shown in
Figure 5. For comparison, I also fit the distribution assuming the 1% to 5% loss of GDP for
∆T = 4◦C represents a 90-percent confidence interval; it is also shown in Figure 5.
5 Willingness to Pay.
I assume that by giving up a fraction w(τ ) of consumption now and throughout the future,
society can ensure that at time H, ∆TH will not exceed τ . Specifically, the distribution
for ∆T is cut off at τ and rescaled to integrate to 1.17 Using the CRRA utility function
of eqn. (6) and the growth rate of consumption given by eqn. (2), w∗(τ ) is the maximum
fraction of consumption society would sacrifice to keep ∆TH ≤ τ . As explained in Section 2,
w∗(τ ) is found by equating the social welfare functionsW1(τ ) and W2 of eqns. (12) and (13).
Given the distributions f(∆T ) and g(γ) for ∆T and γ respectively, denote by Mτ (t) and
15The IAMs surveyed by the IPCC include Hope (2006), Mendelsohn et al (1998), Nordhaus and Boyer
(2000), and Tol (2002). For a recent overview of economic impact studies, see Tol (2009).
16If L is the loss of GDP corresponding to ∆T , 1−L = exp[−β(∆T )2] = exp[−.557γH∆T ]. H = 100 and
∆T = 4◦C, so .97 = e−223.5γ¯, .99 = e−223.5γ1, and .95 = e−223.5γ2. Using instead the 4.5% midpoint of the
1% to 8% range of lost GDP for ∆T = 5◦C from Dietz and Stern (2008), we would have γ¯ = .000165.
17The expected value of ∆TH is E(∆T | τ ) =
(∫ τ
0 xf(x)dx
) /(∫ τ
0 f(x)dx
)
< τ .
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M∞(t) the time-t expectations
Mτ(t) =
1
F (τ )
∫ τ
θT
∫
∞
θγ
eρ˜0−ρ˜1t−ω˜(1/2)
t/H
f(∆T )g(γ)d∆Tdγ (16)
and
M∞(t) =
∫
∞
θT
∫
∞
θγ
eρ˜0−ρ˜1t−ω˜(1/2)
t/H
f(∆T )g(γ)d∆Tdγ , (17)
where ρ˜0, ρ˜1 and ω˜ are given by eqns. (9), (10) and (11), θT and θγ are the lower limits on
the distributions for ∆T and γ, and F (τ ) =
∫ τ
θT
f(∆T )d∆T . Thus W1(τ ) and W2 are:
W1(τ ) =
[1− w(τ )]1−η
1− η
∫
∞
0
Mτ(t)dt ≡
[1− w(τ )]1−η
1− η
Gτ (18)
and
W2 =
1
1− η
∫
∞
0
M∞(t)dt ≡
1
1− η
G∞ . (19)
Setting W1(τ ) equal to W2, WTP is given by:
w∗(τ ) = 1 − [G∞/Gτ ]
1
1−η . (20)
The solution for w∗(τ ) depends on the distributions for ∆T and γ, the horizon H, and
the parameters η, g0, and δ. It is useful to determine how w
∗ varies with τ ; the cost of
abatement is a decreasing function of τ , so given estimates of that cost, one could use these
results to determine abatement targets.
5.1 Parameter Values.
Putting aside the distributions for ∆T and γ, what are reasonable values for the index of
relative risk aversion η, the rate of time discount δ, and the base level real growth rate g0?
As we will see, estimates of WTP depend strongly on these parameters. Also, in the context
of a (deterministic) Ramsey growth model with a growth rate g, the consumption discount
rate is R = δ + ηg, so if η = 2 and δ = g = .02 (all reasonable numbers), R = .06.
The finance and macroeconomics literature has estimates of η ranging from 1.5 to 6, and
estimates of δ ranging from .01 to .04. The growth rate g, measured directly from historical
data, is in the range of .02 to .025. Thus the Ramsey rule puts the consumption discount rate
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in the range of 3% to over 10%, but that rate should be viewed as something close to a private
return on investment (PRI). Indeed, most estimates of η and δ are based on investment
and/or short-run consumption and savings behavior. The social discount rate (SDR) can
differ considerably from the PRI, especially for public investments that involve long time
horizons and strong externalities. It has been argued, for example, that for intergenerational
comparisons, δ should be close to zero, because although most people would value a benefit
today more highly than a year from now, there is no reason why society should impose those
preferences on the well-being of our great-grandchildren relative to our own. Likewise, while
values of η well above 2 may be consistent with the (relatively short-horizon) behavior of
investors, we might apply lower values to welfare comparisons involving future generations.18
Putting aside this debate over the “correct” values of η and δ for intergenerational com-
parisons, I want to determine whether current assessments of uncertainty over temperature
change and economic impact generate a high WTP and thus justify the immediate adoption
of a stringent abatement policy. I will therefore stack the deck, so to speak, in favor of our
great-grandchildren and use relatively low values of η and δ: around 2 for η and 0 for δ.
Also, WTP is a decreasing function of the base growth rate g0 in eqn. (7), so I will use a
range of .015 to .025 for that parameter.
5.2 No Uncertainty.
Removing uncertainty provides some intuition for the determinants of WTP and its depen-
dence on some of the parameters. If the trajectory for ∆T and the impact of that trajectory
on economic growth were both known with certainty, eqns. (18) and (19) would simplify to:
W1(τ ) =
[1− w(τ )]1−η
1− η
∫
∞
0
eρ0−ρ1t−ω(1/2)
t/H
dt , (21)
and
W2 =
1
1− η
∫
∞
0
eρ0−ρ1t−ωτ (1/2)
t/H
dt , (22)
18For arguments in favor of low values for η and δ and low SDRs, see Heal (2009), Stern (2008) and
Summers and Zeckhauser (2008). For opposing views, see Nordhaus (2007) and Weitzman (2007).
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where ω = 2(η − 1)γ¯H∆TH/ ln(1/2) and ωτ = 2(η − 1)γ¯τ/ ln(1/2). (I am using the mean,
γ¯, as the certainty-equivalent value of γ.)
I calculate the WTP to keep ∆T zero for all time, i.e., w∗(0), over a range of values for
∆T at the horizon H = 100. For this exercise, I set η = 2, δ = 0, and g = .015, .020, and
.025. The results are shown in Figure 6. The graph says that if, for example, ∆TH = 6
◦C
and g0 = .02, w
∗(0) is about .022, i.e., society should be willing to give about 2.2% of current
and future consumption to keep ∆T at zero instead of 6◦C.19 Although w∗(0) is considerably
larger if ∆TH is known to be 8
◦C or more, such temperature outcomes have low probability.
Note that for any known ∆TH, a lower initial growth rate g0 implies a higher WTP. The
reason is that lowering g0 lowers the entire trajectory for the consumption discount rate Rt.
That rate falls as ∆T increases (and can eventually become negative), but its starting value
is δ + ηg0. The damages from warming (a falling growth rate as ∆T increases) are initially
small, making estimates of WTP highly dependent on the values for δ, η, and g0.
5.3 Uncertainty Limited to Temperature Change.
I now turn to the effects of uncertainty over ∆T . I will assume that the loss function is
deterministic, with the parameter γ fixed at its mean value γ¯ = .0001363. Eqns. (16) and
(17) then simplify as follows:
Mτ (t) =
1
F (τ )
∫ τ
θT
eρ˜0−ρ˜1t−ω˜(1/2)
t/H
f(∆T )d∆T (23)
and
M∞(t) =
∫
∞
θT
eρ˜0−ρ˜1t−ω˜(1/2)
t/H
f(∆T )d∆T , (24)
where now γ¯ replaces γ in ρ˜0, ρ˜1 and ω˜.
Figure 7 shows w∗(τ ) for δ = 0, η = 2, and g0 = .015, .020, and .025. Observe that
WTP is below 2%, even for τ = 0, and is closer to 1% if g0 = .020 or .025. A feasible (i.e.,
attainable using a realistic abatement policy) value for τ is probably around 2◦C, which
makes WTP considerably smaller.
19Remember that the “known ∆T” is not constant, and applies only to time t = H . ∆T follows the
trajectory given by eqn. (1).
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Table 1: WTP, only ∆T Stochastic
Base
τ Case S = 1.5S0 V = 1.5V0 γ = .0002726
0 .0113 .0106 .0126 .0232
1 .0092 .0084 .0107 .0190
3 .0053 .0049 .0069 .0112
5 .0026 .0026 .0038 .0056
7 .0011 .0013 .0017 .0024
10 .0002 .0004 .0003 .0005
Note: Each entry is w∗(τ ), fraction of consumption society would sacrifice to ensure that
∆TH ≤ τ . H = 100 years, δ = 0, η = 2, g0 = .02.
Table 1 shows w∗(τ ) for several values of τ , using the base distribution for ∆T shown
in Figure 2, with δ = 0, η = 2, and g0 = .02. (The parameter γ in the loss function is
again fixed at γ¯ = .0001363.) The first column duplicates the low WTP numbers shown in
Figure 7. The next two columns show how w∗(τ ) changes when the skewness or variance of
the distribution for ∆T is increased by 50%, in each case holding the other two moments
fixed. The increase in skewness reduces w∗(τ ) for τ < 5◦C, because it pushes some of the
probability mass from the right to the left tail. For τ = 7◦C or more, w∗(τ ) is increased, but
only modestly, because even with this increase in skewness, the probability of a ∆T of 7◦C or
more is very low. A 50% increase in the variance of the distribution (holding the mean and
skewness fixed) increases w∗(τ ) for all values of τ , but only modestly. For example, w∗(3◦)
increases from 0.53% of consumption to 0.69%.
Of course this ignores uncertainty over the loss function. The last column of Table 1
shows w∗(τ ) for the original distribution of ∆T , but a doubling of the parameter γ. This
has a substantial effect on the WTP, roughly doubling all of the base case numbers. But
w∗(0) is still only about 2.3%.
5.4 Uncertainty Over Temperature and Economic Impact.
I now allow for uncertainty over both ∆T and the impact parameter γ, using the calibrated
distributions for each. WTP is now given by eqns. (16) to (20). The calculated values of
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WTP are shown in Figure 8 for δ = 0, η = 2, and g0 = .015, .020, and .025. Note that if
g0 is .02 or greater, WTP is always less than 1.2%, even for τ = 0. To obtain a WTP at or
above 2% requires an initial growth rate of only .015 or a lower value of η. The figure also
shows the WTP for η = 1.5 and g0 = .02; now w
∗(0) reaches 3.5%.
Figure 9 shows the dependence of WTP on the index of risk aversion, η. It plots w∗(3),
i.e., the WTP to ensure ∆TH ≤ 3
◦C at H = 100 years, for an initial growth rate of .02.
Although w∗(3) is below 2% for moderate values of η, it comes close to 6% if η is reduced
to 1 (the value of η used in Stern (2007)). The reason is that while future utility is not
discounted (because δ = 0), future consumption is implicitly discounted at the initial rate
ηg0. If η (or for that matter g0) is made smaller, potential losses of future consumption have
a larger impact on WTP. Finally, Figure 9 also shows that discounting future utility, even at
a very low rate, will considerably reduce WTP. If δ is increased to .01, w∗(3) is again below
2% for all values of η.
We have seen that large values of WTP are obtained only for fairly extreme combinations
of parameter values. However, these results are based on distributions for ∆T and the impact
parameter γ that were fitted to studies in the IPCC’s 2007 report, as well as concurrent
economic studies, and those studies were actually done several years prior to 2007. Some
more recent studies indicate that “most likely” values for ∆T in 2100 might be higher than
the 1.0◦C to 4.5◦C range given by the IPCC. For example, a recent report by Sokolov et al
(2009) suggests an expected value for ∆T in 2100 of around 4 to 5◦C, as opposed to the
3.0◦C expected value that I have used.
Suppose, for example, that the distribution for ∆TH based on the IPCC is correct, but
warming is accelerated so that it now applies to a shortened horizon of H = 75 years.
Figure 10 duplicates Figure 9 except that H = 75. Observe that if δ = 0 and η is close to 1,
w∗(3) reaches 8%. (However, w∗(3) is much lower if δ = .01.)
Alternatively, we could shift the entire distribution for ∆TH so that the mean is 5
◦C,
corresponding to the upper end of the 4 to 5◦C range in Sokolov et al (2009). Figure 11
duplicates Figure 9 except that the mean of ∆TH has been increased from 3
◦C to 5◦C, with
the other moments of the distribution left unchanged, and H again 100 years. Now if δ = 0
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and η is below 1.5, w∗(3) is above 3%, and reaches 10% if η = 1. Thus there are parameter
values and plausible distributions for ∆T that yield a large WTP, but that are outside of
what is at least the current consensus range.
5.5 Policy Implications.
The policy implications of these results are stark. For temperature and impact distributions
based on the IPCC and “conservative” parameter values (e.g., δ = 0, η = 2, and g0 =
.02), WTP to prevent any increase in temperature is around 2% or less. And if the policy
objective is to ensure that ∆T in 100 years does not exceed its expected value of 3◦C (a
much more feasible objective), WTP is lower still.
There are two reasons for these results. First, there is limited weight in the tails of the
distributions for ∆T and γ. The distribution calibrated for ∆T implies a 21% probability
of ∆T ≥ 4.5◦C in 100 years, and a 5% probability of ∆T ≥ 7.0◦C, numbers consistent with
the climate sensitivity studies surveyed by the IPCC. Likewise, the calibrated distribution
for γ implies a 17% probability of γ ≥ .00023, also consistent with the IPCC and other
surveys. A realization in which, say, ∆T = 4.5◦C and γ = .00023 would imply that GDP and
consumption in 100 years would be 5.7 percent lower than with no increase in temperature.20
However, the probability of ∆T ≥ 4.5◦C and γ ≥ .00023 is only about 3.6%. An even more
extreme outcome in which ∆T = 7◦C (and γ = .00023) would imply about a 9 percent loss
of GDP in 100 years, but the probability of an outcome this bad or worse is only 0.9%.
Second, even if δ = 0 so that utility is not discounted, the implicit discounting of con-
sumption is significant. The initial consumption discount rate is ρ0 = ηg0, which is at least
.03 if η = 2. And a (low-probability) 5.7 or 9 percent loss of GDP in 100 years would involve
much smaller losses in earlier years.
Although these estimates of WTP do not support the immediate adoption of a stringent
GHG abatement policy, they do not imply that no abatement is optimal. For example, 2% of
GDP is in the range of cost estimates for compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.21 Taking the
20If γ = .00023 and ∆T = 4.5◦C, β = γH/1.89∆T = .00270, and from eqn. (3), L = e−β(∆T )
2
= .947.
21See the survey of cost studies by the Energy Information Administration (1998), and the more recent
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U.S. in isolation, a WTP of 2% amounts to about $300 billion per year, a rather substantial
amount for GHG abatement. And if, e.g., w∗(3) = .01, a $150 billion per year expenditure
on abatement would be justified if it would indeed limit warming to 3◦C.
6 Conclusions.
I have approached climate policy analysis from the point of view of a simple measure of
“willingness to pay”: the fraction of consumption w∗(τ ) that society would sacrifice to ensure
that any increase in temperature at a future point is limited to τ . This avoids having to make
projections of GHG emissions and atmospheric concentrations, or estimate abatement costs.
Instead I could focus directly on uncertainties over temperature change and over the economic
impact of higher temperatures. Also, I modeled economic impact as a relationship between
temperature change and the growth rate of GDP as opposed to its level. Using information
on the distributions for temperature change and economic impact from studies assembled
by the IPCC and from recent IAMs (the current “state of knowledge” regarding warming
and its impact), I fit displaced gamma distributions for ∆T and an impact parameter γ. I
then examined whether “reasonable” values for the remaining parameters could yield values
of w∗(τ ) above 2% or 3% for small values of τ , which might support stringent abatement,
and found that for the most part they could not.
For “conservative” parameter values, e.g., δ = 0, η = 2, and g0 = .015 or .02, WTP to
prevent any increase in temperature is only around 2%, and is well below 2% if the objective
is to keep ∆T in 100 years below its expected value of 3◦C. Given what we know about the
distributions for temperature change and its impact, it is difficult to obtain a large WTP
unless η is reduced to 1.5 or less, or we assume warming will occur at a more accelerated
rate than the IPCC projects. There are two reasons for these results: limited weight in the
tails of the distributions for ∆T and γ, and the effect of consumption discounting.
It is an understatement to say that caveats are in order. First, although I have incor-
porated what I believe to be the current consensus on the distributions for temperature
country cost studies surveyed in IPCC (2007c).
21
change and its impact, this consensus may be wrong, especially with respect to the tails of
the distributions. Indeed, some recent studies suggest that warming could be greater and/or
more rapid than the IPCC suggests. We have no historical or experimental data from which
to assess the likelihood of a ∆T above 5◦C, never mind its economic impact, and one could
argue a´ la Weitzman (2009) that we will never have sufficient data because the distributions
are fat-tailed, implying a WTP of 100% (or at least something much larger than 2%). In
addition, the loss function of eqn. (2) is linear, and a convex relationship between ∆T and
the growth rate gt may be more realistic.
The real debate among economists is not so much over the need for some kind of GHG
abatement policy, but rather whether a stringent policy is needed now, or instead abatement
should begin slowly or be delayed for some time. My results are consistent with beginning
slowly. In addition, beginning slowly has other virtues. It is likely to be dynamically efficient
because of discounting (most damages will occur in the distant future) and because of the
likelihood that technological change will reduce the cost of abatement over time. Also, there
is an “option value” to waiting for more information before adopting a stringent policy that
imposes large sunk costs on consumers. Over the next ten or twenty years we may learn
much more about climate sensitivity, the economic impact of higher temperatures, and the
cost of abatement, in part from ongoing research, and in part from the accumulation of
additional data.
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Figure 1: Example of Economic Impact of Temperature Change. (Note temperature in-
creases by 5◦C over 50 years and then falls to original level over next 50 years. CA is
consumption when ∆T reduces level, CB is consumption when ∆T reduces growth rate, and
C0 is consumption with no temperature change.)
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Figure 2: Base Distribution for Temperature Change.
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Figure 3: Temperature Change Distribution: 50% Increase in Variance, Skewness
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Figure 4: Temperature Change: Unconstrained and Constrained So ∆TH ≤ τ
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Figure 5: Distributions for Loss Function Parameter γ
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Figure 6: WTP When Temperature Change is Known
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Figure 7: WTP for Base Distribution of ∆T , η = 2, δ = 0
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Figure 8: WTP, Both ∆T and γ Uncertain. η = 2 and 1.5, g0 = .015, .020, .025, and δ = 0
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Figure 9: WTP Versus η for τ = 3. g0 = .020 and δ = 0 and .01
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Figure 10: WTP Versus η for τ = 3. H = 75, g0 = .020, δ = 0 and .01
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Figure 11: WTP Versus η for τ = 3. E(∆TH) = 5
◦C, H = 100, g0 = .020, δ = 0 and .01
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